@techreport{Kolmar2010Inefficient,
abstract = {Contests between groups are plagued by intra-group externalities (freeriding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might not be desirable, neither individually nor socially. In contests among two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound strength differences between groups. If both groups rein in their intra-group externalities, they are both worse off, compared to a situation with free-riding, if they are relatively similar. If they are sufficiently heterogenous, the weak group loses at the expense of the relatively strong group.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Martin Kolmar and Andreas Wagener},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {Z13; D72; N40; D74; 330; conflict; incentives; group-size paradox; Gruppenarbeit; Wettbewerb; Arbeitsorganisation; Betrieblicher Konflikt; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten; Leistungsanreiz; Wirtschaftliche Effizienz; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {3157},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {Inefficient group organization as optimal adaption to dominant environments},
type = {CESifo working paper Public Choice},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39850},
year = {2010}
}
