@techreport{Cavallari2001Inflationary,
abstract = {Building on a micro-founded model of a two region-world economy
in the tradition of the new open economy literature, this paper
analyses the strategic interaction of large wage-setters and the central
bank when switching from a regime of uncoordinated national monetary
policies to a monetary union. The establishment of a monetary
union is shown to favour wage restraint, provided the uni\ldots{}ed central
bank is not too conservative. Wage discipline may reduce equilibrium
in\textdaggerdbl{}ation in a monetary union relative to the one under uncoordinated
national monetary policies when wage setting is centralised
across member countries.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Lilia Cavallari},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {E5; F4; 330; monetary union; wage bargaining; inflationary bias; W\"{a}hrungsunion; Inflation; Lohnverhandlungstheorie; Geldpolitik; Internationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordination},
language = {eng},
number = {B 11-2001},
publisher = {ZEI},
title = {Inflationary performance in a monetary union with large wage setters},
type = {ZEI working paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39559},
year = {2001}
}
