@techreport{Bruckner2001Strategic,
abstract = {The literature on tax competition generally concludes that international coordination
of capital taxes among symmetric countries increases tax rates. This paper
investigates whether this conclusion also holds in a political economy framework
where taxes are set by elected policy makers. It shows that policy makers are fiscally
more liberal than the average citizen if taxes are set non-cooperatively. However,
fiscally more conservative policy makers are elected if taxes are set cooperatively.
The introduction of tax coordination cannot remove the incentive to compete for
foreign capital, but simply shifts it to the election stage. The paper proves that
with standard specifications of the utility functions, coordination leads to lower tax
rates than competition.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Matthias Br\"{u}ckner},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H2; 330; Tax competition; tax coordination; strategic delegation; Kapitalertragsteuer; Steuerwettbewerb; Steuerharmonisierung; \"{O}konomische Theorie der Demokratie; Median Voter},
language = {eng},
number = {B 22-2001},
publisher = {ZEI},
title = {Strategic delegation and international capital taxation},
type = {ZEI working paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39543},
year = {2001}
}
