@techreport{DiTella2001determination,
abstract = {While much empirical research has been done on the labour market consequences
of unemployment benefits, there is remarkably little evidence on the forces
determining benefits. The paper presents a simple model where workers desire
insurance against the possibility of unemployment and unemployment benefits
increase the unemployment rate. We then conduct, what we believe, is one of the
first empirical analyses of the determinants of the parameters of the unemployment
benefit system. Using OECD data for 1971-1989, controlling for year and country
fixed effects, and controlling for the political colour of the government, we find
evidence suggesting that benefits fall when the unemployment rate is high. This is
consistent with the tax-effect described in Wright (1986) and Atkinson (1990).
There is weaker evidence that benefits increase with positive changes in the
unemployment rate, which may be proxying for the inflow rate and could be called
an insurance effect.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Rafael DiTella and Robert MacCulloch},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H53; J65; 330; endogenous unemployment benefits; unemployment; politics; Arbeitslosenversicherung; Arbeitslosigkeit; Arbeitsmarktpolitik; Zeitpr\"{a}ferenz; Theorie; OECD-Staaten},
language = {eng},
number = {B 04-2001},
publisher = {ZEI},
title = {The determination of unemployment benefits},
type = {ZEI working paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39454},
year = {2001}
}
