@techreport{Fasten2010sided,
abstract = {Certifiers contribute to the sound functioning of markets by reducing asymmetric information. They, however, have been heavily criticized during the 2008-09 financial crisis. This paper investigates on which side of the market a monopolistic profit-maximizing certifier offers his service. If the seller demands a rating, the certifier announces the product quality publicly, whereas if the buyer requests a rating it remains his private information. The model shows that the certifier offers his service to sellers and buyers to maximize his own profit with a higher share from the sellers. Overall, certifiers increase welfare in specific markets. Revenue shifts due to the financial crisis are also explained.},
address = {Berlin},
author = {Erik R. Fasten and Dirk Hofmann},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {G14; G24; L15; D82; 330; Certification; Rating Agencies; Asymmetric Information; Financial Markets; Ratingagentur; Finanzdienstleistung; Kreditw\"{u}rdigkeit; Asymmetrische Information; Monopol; Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung; Wohlfahrtseffekt},
language = {eng},
number = {2010,007},
publisher = {SFB 649, Economic Risk},
title = {Two-sided certification: The market for rating agencies},
type = {SFB 649 discussion paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39306},
year = {2010}
}
