@techreport{Dreher2010costs,
abstract = {As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Axel Dreher and Stephan Klasen and James Raymond Vreeland and Eric Werker},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {O19; O11 : F35; 330; World Bank; aid effectiveness; political influence; United Nations Security Council; Entwicklungshilfe; Entwicklungsfinanzierung; Entwicklungsprojekt; Projektbewertung; Public Choice; Internationale Organisation; Internationale Sicherheit; Mitgliedschaft; Auslandsverschuldung; Welt},
language = {eng},
number = {2993},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?},
type = {CESifo working paper Public Finance},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39009},
year = {2010}
}
