@techreport{Bierbrauer2010Optimal,
abstract = {We study how an optimal income tax and an optimal public-goods provision rule respond to preference and productivity shocks. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with similar interests. We therefore extend the Mirrleesian model so as to include a requirement of coalition-proofness. The main results are the following: first, the possibility of preference shocks yields a new set of collective incentive constraints. Productivity shocks have no such implication. Second, the optimal policy gives rise to a positive correlation between the public-goods provision level, the extent of redistribution and marginal tax rates.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Felix Bierbrauer},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D71; D82; H21; H41; 330; Public Goods; Optimal Taxation; Mechanism Design; Einkommensteuer; Optimale Besteuerung; Verteilungspolitik; Pr\"{a}ferenztheorie; Produktivit\"{a}t; Schock; \"{O}ffentliches Gut; Versorgung; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2010,18},
publisher = {Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods},
title = {Optimal income taxation and public-goods provision with preference and productivity shocks},
type = {Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38868},
year = {2010}
}
