@inproceedings{Niepmann2010Bank,
abstract = {Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally and engaged in cross-border operations. As a result, financial crises and potential bail-outs by governments have important international implications. Extending Allen and Gale (2000), we provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bail-outs financed by distortionary taxes. In the sequential game between governments, there are inefficiencies due to spillovers, free-riding and limited burden-sharing. When countries are of equal size, an increase in cross-border deposit holdings improves, in general, the non-cooperative outcome. For efficient crisis managment, ex-ante fiscal burden sharing is essential as ex-post contracts between governments do not achieve the same global welfare.},
address = {Frankfurt a. M.},
author = {Friederike Niepmann and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {F36; G28; F42; 330; bail-out; contagion; financial crisis; international institutional arrangements},
language = {eng},
number = {D7-V3},
publisher = {Verein f\"{u}r Socialpolitik},
series = {Beitr\"{a}ge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins f\"{u}r Socialpolitik 2010: \"{O}konomie der Familie - Session: Causes and Consequences of Bank Bail-Outs},
title = {Bank Bail-outs, International Linkages and Cooperation},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37518},
year = {2010}
}
