@inproceedings{Kolle2010Inequality,
abstract = {We investigate the effects of wealth inequality on the incentives to contribute to a public good or a team output when agents are inequity averse. We show that inequality may increase total output when it favors the more able agents. Moreover, the more inequity averse the agents, the larger should be the inequality in wealth if total output is to be maximized.},
address = {Frankfurt a. M.},
author = {Felix K\"{o}lle and Dirk Sliwka and Nannan Zhou},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {M50; M52; D31; 330; Public good; team incentives; inequity aversion; inequality; wage setting},
language = {eng},
number = {F12-V2},
publisher = {Verein f\"{u}r Socialpolitik},
series = {Beitr\"{a}ge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins f\"{u}r Socialpolitik 2010: \"{O}konomie der Familie - Session: Formation and Performance of Teams},
title = {Inequality and Team Performance},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37514},
year = {2010}
}
