@inproceedings{Roider2010Optimal,
abstract = {We investigate a moral hazard model with a one-sided commitment problem. That is, after effort provision, the agent is free to either stay with the principal or to leave and pursue his (ex-post) outside option, the value of which is increasing in effort. Depending on parameters, optimal contracts have interesting properties, such as first-best effort incentives, nonresponsiveness to underlying parameters, or inefficient separation. Moreover, the agent might suffer from a ceteris paribus improvement of his outside option. Potential applications of this framework include employment relationships and venture capital financing.},
address = {Frankfurt a. M.},
author = {Andreas Roider and Florian Englmaier and Gerd M\"{u}hlheusser},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; K31; M52; 330; moral hazard; limited commitment; ex-post outside option; limited liability},
language = {eng},
number = {A8-V1},
publisher = {Verein f\"{u}r Socialpolitik},
series = {Beitr\"{a}ge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins f\"{u}r Socialpolitik 2010: \"{O}konomie der Familie - Session: Asymmetric Information and Incentives},
title = {Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37476},
year = {2010}
}
