@inproceedings{Betz2010Initial,
abstract = {We analyse the efficiency effects of the initial permit allocation given to firms with market power in both permit and output market. We examine two models: a long-run model with endogenous technology and capacity choice, and a short-run model with fixed technology and capacity. In the long run, quantity pre-commitment with Bertrand competition can yield Cournot outcomes also under emissions trading. In the short run, Bertrand output competition reproduces the effects derived under Cournot competition, but displays higher pass-through profits. In a second-best setting of overallocation, a tighter emissions target tends to improve permit-market efficiency in the short run.},
address = {Frankfurt a. M.},
author = {Regina Betz and Evan M. Calford and Christoph Heinzel},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L13; Q28; D43; 330; emissions trading; initial permit allocation; Bertrand competition; EU ETS; endogenous technology choice; Kreps and Scheinkman},
language = {eng},
number = {E9-V3},
publisher = {Verein f\"{u}r Socialpolitik},
series = {Beitr\"{a}ge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins f\"{u}r Socialpolitik 2010: \"{O}konomie der Familie - Session: Regulating Related Industries},
title = {Initial Allocation Effects in Permit Markets with Bertrand Output Oligopoly},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37424},
year = {2010}
}
