@inproceedings{Winkler2010Markets,
abstract = {Efficiency and sustainability often clash if limited-tenure use rights for renewable natural resources are rented to private resource managers. We introduce a mechanism reconciling these two issues for a stochastically developing natural resource. The mechanism selects the most patient and, thus, most sustainably harvesting resource manager in a second-price sealed-bid auction with minimum bids and it overcomes the incentive to mine the resource at the end of tenure by announcing a refund if a sustainability goal is obeyed. In addition, the mechanism ensures efficiency and is self-financing in expectation.},
address = {Frankfurt a. M.},
author = {Ralph Winkler and Martin Quaas},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {Q20; D44; D82; 330; auctioning-refunding-mechanism; efficiency; renewable resource; stochastic model; sustainability},
language = {eng},
number = {A15-V2},
publisher = {Verein f\"{u}r Socialpolitik},
series = {Beitr\"{a}ge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins f\"{u}r Socialpolitik 2010: \"{O}konomie der Familie - Session: Optimal Resource Extraction},
title = {Markets for Sustainable Resource Use: Auctioned Limited-Tenure Use Rights with Refunding},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37366},
year = {2010}
}
