@inproceedings{Chla2010Impact,
abstract = {Games of imperfect information distribute information unevenly amongst parties. Recently, parties have been claimed to hold preferences purely over such procedural aspects. Here, I explore the impact purely procedural preferences exert if agents are without influence on the procedure itself. I design a game of imperfect information which exhibits extreme procedural asymmetry in that several procedural aspects advantage one and the same party over another. In an experimental test, parties are found to monetarily compensate the asymmetry such that almost no winner's curse results. I explain the compensation by an instrument for purely procedural preferences (Chla\ss{} et al. 2009). The residual winner's curse links to personality traits. The game abstracts a management buy-in, the natural counterpart to a management buy-out.},
address = {Frankfurt a. M.},
author = {Nadine Chla\ss{}},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C78; D63; D82; 330; procedural preferences; asymmetric information; winner's curse},
language = {eng},
number = {F13-V1},
publisher = {Verein f\"{u}r Socialpolitik},
series = {Beitr\"{a}ge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins f\"{u}r Socialpolitik 2010: \"{O}konomie der Familie - Session: Experimental Game Theory},
title = {The Impact of Procedural Asymmetry in Games of Imperfect  Information},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37253},
year = {2010}
}
