@techreport{Altmann2010Implicit,
abstract = {We analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties can form long-term employment relationships, we compare a work environment where effort is observable, but not verifiable to a situation where explicit contracts are feasible. Our main result shows that unemployment is much higher when third-party contract enforcement is absent. Unemployment is involuntary, being caused by firms' employment and contracting policy. Moreover, we show that implicit contracting can lead to a segmentation of the labor market. Firms in both segments earn similar profits, but workers in the secondary sector face much less favorable conditions than their counterparts in primary-sector jobs.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Steffen Altmann and Armin Falk and David Huffman},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C92; J64; M55; 330; Incentives; implicit contracts; unemployment; fairness; dual labor markets; Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit; Arbeitsvertrag; Implizite Kontrakte; Leistungsanreiz; Gerechtigkeit; Dualer Arbeitsmarkt; Arbeitsbedingungen; Test},
language = {eng},
number = {5001},
publisher = {IZA},
title = {Implicit contracts, unemployment, and labor market segmentation},
type = {Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36857},
year = {2010}
}
