@techreport{Bieta2008banking,
abstract = {In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models. In our banking model each project of a borrower is described by a continuous density of outcomes. Different density functions are classified according to second stochastisch dominance. Combining these features we find that in a banking model collateral is no longer in a position to signal the degree of riskiness of the borrower to the lender. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium.},
address = {Dresden},
author = {Volker Bieta and Udo Broll and Wilfried Siebe},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D8; G20; 330; Signaling; collateral; perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Signalling; Kreditgesch\"{a}ft; Asymmetrische Information; Bayes-Statistik},
language = {eng},
number = {04/08},
publisher = {Univ. of Technology, Fac. of Business Management and Economics},
title = {The banking firm: the role of signaling with collaterals},
type = {Dresden discussion paper series in economics},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36482},
year = {2008}
}
