@techreport{Dur2010Reciprocity,
abstract = {We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Robert Dur and Arjan Non and Hein Roelfsema},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D86; J41; M51; M52; M54; M55; 330; Reciprocity; social exchange; incentive contracts; double moral hazard; GSOEP; Anreizvertrag; Verantwortung; Moral Hazard; Deutschland},
language = {eng},
number = {4782},
publisher = {IZA},
title = {Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace},
type = {IZA Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36039},
year = {2010}
}
