@techreport{Chiappori2009unitary,
abstract = {This article considers non-unitary models of household behavior. These models suppose explicitly that households consist of a number of different members with preferences that are different from each other. They can be split up into two principal categories: cooperative (or collective) models, in which the allocations are supposed to be Pareto efficient; and non-cooperative (or strategic) models which are based on the concept of Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The demand functions that describe household behavior in these models are subject to constraints that differ from the traditional Slutsky conditions. In addition, in a certain number of specific cases, the preferences of the different household members can be identified from observable behavior.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Pierre-Andr\'{e} Chiappori and Olivier Donni},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D11; D13; J22; 330; Households; collective model; strategic model; testability; identification; Privater Haushalt; Haushalts\"{o}konomik; Konsumentenverhalten; Statistischer Test; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {4603},
publisher = {IZA},
title = {Non-unitary models of household behavior: a survey of the literature},
type = {IZA Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35980},
year = {2009}
}
