@techreport{Kaas2008Minimum,
abstract = {Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are studied under laissez-faire and under a minimum wage regime. Up to a restriction for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the imposition of a minimum wage is always welfare-improving because of its effect on non-wage job characteristics.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Leo Kaas and Paul Madden},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D43; 330; Hotelling; duopsony; minimum wages; Hotelling Modell; Arbeitsnachfrage; Lohn; R\"{a}umlicher Wettbewerb; Mindestlohn; Wohlfahrtseffekt; Theorie},
language = {eng},
note = {urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008040997},
number = {3434},
publisher = {IZA},
title = {Minimum wages and welfare in a hotelling duopsony},
type = {IZA Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35125},
year = {2008}
}
