@techreport{Gagliarducci2008Electoral,
abstract = {Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower politicians' rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using micro data for the mixed-member Italian House of Representatives, which allow us to sidestep the identification problems of previous studies based on country-level data. In particular, we address the nonrandom selection into different electoral systems by exploiting a distinctive feature of the Italian two-tier elections from 1994 to 2006: candidates could run for both the majoritarian and the proportional tier, but if they won in both tiers they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi-experimental estimates of the impact of the electoral rule. The main results confirm theoretical predictions, as majoritarian representatives put forward a higher proportion of bills targeted at local areas and show lower absenteeism rates than their proportional colleagues.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Stefano Gagliarducci and Tommaso Nannicini and Paolo Naticchioni},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C20; 320; Electoral rule; politicians; targeted redistribution; rent-seeking; regression discontinuity design; treatment effect; Politiker; Verhalten; Wahlsystem; Regionalpolitik; Wahlkreis; Rent Seeking; Italien},
language = {eng},
number = {3348},
publisher = {IZA},
title = {Electoral rules and politicians' behavior: a micro test},
type = {IZA Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/34826},
year = {2008}
}
