@techreport{Miettinen2006Political,
abstract = {We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Topi Miettinen and Panu Poutvaara},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D72; D85; L14; 330; political parties; two-sided platforms; network formation; Patronage; Rent Seeking; Politische Partei; Klubtheorie; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1918},
publisher = {IZA},
title = {Political parties and network formation},
type = {IZA Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33550},
year = {2006}
}
