@techreport{Kaas2006Holdup,
abstract = {We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns on investment while only firms bear the costs, investment is inefficiently low. A binding minimum wage can achieve the first-best level of investment, both in the short run for a given number of firms and in the long run when the number of firms is endogenous.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Leo Kaas and Paul Madden},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D43; J48; 330; holdup; investment; minimum wage; Arbeitsmarkttheorie; Monopolistischer Wettbewerb; Oligopol; Mindestlohn; Investition; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2043},
publisher = {IZA},
title = {Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets: a new role for the minimum wage},
type = {IZA Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33401},
year = {2006}
}
