@techreport{Irlenbusch2005Incentives,
abstract = {A simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period. In a second setting the principal has the possibility to supplement the fixed wage with a piece rate. Surprisingly, efforts are lower in the case where piece rates can be paid. Furthermore, switching in the same treatment from a setting where piece rates are available to one where only fixed wages can be paid tends to lead to even lower effort levels. Based on our findings we suggest a new explanation for motivation crowding out by arguing that the use of piece rates considerably alters the principals' and agents' perception of the situation.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Bernd Irlenbusch and Dirk Sliwka},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C91; 330; incentives; crowding-out; reciprocity; reputation; experiment},
language = {eng},
number = {1758},
publisher = {IZA},
title = {Incentives, decision frames, and motivation crowding out: an experimental investigation},
type = {IZA Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33245},
year = {2005}
}
