@techreport{Gropp2010Competition,
abstract = {This paper empirically investigates the effect of government bail-out policies on banks outside the safety net. We construct a measure of bail-out perceptions by using rating information. From there, we construct the market shares of insured competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks&rsquo; risk-taking behavior, using a large sample of banks from OECD countries. Our results suggest that government guarantees strongly increase the risk-taking of competitor banks. In contrast, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks' risk-taking, except for banks that have outright public ownership. These results have important implications for the effects of the recent wave of bank bail-outs on banks' risk-taking behavior.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Reint Gropp and Hendrik Hakenes and Isabel Schnabel},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {G21; G28; L53; 330; Government bail-out; implicit and explicit government guarantees; banking competition; risk-taking},
language = {eng},
number = {2010,05},
publisher = {Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods},
title = {Competition, risk-shifting, and public bail-out policies},
type = {Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32209},
year = {2010}
}
