@techreport{Glockner2009Leading,
abstract = {We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Andreas Gl\"{o}ckner and Bernd Irlenbusch and Sebastian Kube and Andreas Nicklisch and Hans-Theo Normann},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C91; C92; H40; H41; 330; Experiments; Leadership; Reciprocity; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism; Gruppenarbeit; \"{O}ffentliches Gut; Spieltheorie; F\"{u}hrungspers\"{o}nlichkeit; Reziprozit\"{a}t; Test},
language = {eng},
number = {2009,8},
publisher = {Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods},
title = {Leading with(out) sacrifice? A public-goods experiment with a super-additive player},
type = {Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32201},
year = {2009}
}
