@techreport{Bierbrauer2010Incomplete,
abstract = {We study the provision of an excludable public good to discuss whether the imposition of participation constraints is desirable. It is shown that this question may equivalently be cast as follows: should a firm that produces a public good receive tax revenues, or face a self-financing requirement. The main result is that the desirability of participation constraints is shaped by an equity-efficiency tradeoff: While first-best is out of reach with participation constraints, their imposition yields a more equitable distribution of the surplus. This result relies on an incomplete contracts perspective. With a benevolent mechanism designer, participation constraints are never desirable.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Felix Bierbrauer},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; D86; H41; L51; 330; Mechanism Design; Incomplete Contracts; Public Goods; Regulation},
language = {eng},
number = {2010,01},
publisher = {Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods},
title = {Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods},
type = {Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32196},
year = {2010}
}
