@techreport{Kirchkamp2008Heterogeneous,
abstract = {We present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding in first-price auctions. We investigate how the amount of underbidding depends on seemingly innocent parameters of the experimental setup. To structure our data we present and test a theory of constant markdown bids. While a fraction of bidders can be well described by Bayesian Nash equilibrium bids, a larger fraction seems to either use constant markdown bids or seems to rationally optimise against a population where some members use markdown bids and some are rational.},
address = {Jena},
author = {Oliver Kirchkamp and J. Philipp Reiss},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C92; D44; 330; Auction; experiment; overbidding; underbidding; risk-aversion.; Auktionstheorie; Risikoaversion; Test},
language = {eng},
number = {2008,066},
publisher = {Universit\"{a}t Jena und Max-Planck-Institut f\"{u}r \"{O}konomik},
title = {Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and markdown bidderstheory and experiment},
type = {Jena economic research papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31716},
year = {2008}
}
