@techreport{Bruttel2009Voluntary,
abstract = {Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main experimental treatments distinguish long versus short horizon and strict versus non-strict additional equilibrium compared to the control treatment, a standard prisoners' dilemma. Quite surprisingly, according to our results, only a strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rate for a given time horizon. As expected a longer time horizon promotes cooperation.},
address = {Jena},
author = {Lisa V. Bruttel and Werner G\"{u}th and Ulrich Kamecke and Vera Popova},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C73; C91; 330; Folk theorem; Finite horizon; Prisoners'  dilemma; Experiment; Gefangenendilemma; Kooperation; Extensives Spiel; Folk-Theorem; Test},
language = {eng},
number = {2009,030},
publisher = {Universit\"{a}t Jena und Max-Planck-Institut f\"{u}r \"{O}konomik},
title = {Voluntary cooperation based on equilibrium retribution: an experiment testing finite-horizon folk theorems},
type = {Jena economic research papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31715},
year = {2009}
}
