@techreport{Chami2002better,
abstract = {Why do some U.S. states have higher levels of marital formation than others? This paper introduces an economic model wherein a state's representative individual may choose to marry in order to diversity his or her idiosyncratic income risk. The paper demonstrates that such a diversification motive is enhanced for some utility functions when a state's level of undiversifiable risk becomes larger, and when a state's initial income and growth rate is lower. A test of the model's predictious, using cross - sectional data for the 50 U.S. states, suggests that there is broad support for a risk sharing motive for marriage as well as for a precautionary attitude towards risk. - Consumption Insurance ; Marriage},
address = {Claremont, Calif.},
author = {Ralph Chami and Gregory D. Hess},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
editor = {Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies},
keywords = {J12; D1; E21; 330; Regionale Disparit\"{a}t; Familien\"{o}konomik; Verdienstausfall; Risiko; Versicherung; Theorie; Sch\"{a}tzung; USA; Eherecht; Ehe},
language = {eng},
number = {2002-07},
publisher = {Claremont Inst. for Economic Policy Studies},
title = {For better or for worse? State-level marital formation and risk sharing},
type = {Working paper series // Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31429},
year = {2002}
}
