@techreport{Neyman2005Growth,
abstract = {This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall.},
address = {New Brunswick, NJ},
author = {Abraham Neyman and Daijiro Okada},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; C73; 330; Bounded Rationality; Strategy Set Growth; Strategic Complexity; Nonstationary Bounded Recall; Repeated Games; Entropy; Soziale Beziehungen; Beschr\"{a}nkte Rationalit\"{a}t; Zeit; Wiederholte Spiele; Entropie; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2005,14},
publisher = {Dep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey},
title = {Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall},
type = {Working papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31298},
year = {2005}
}
