@techreport{Dekel2006Vote,
abstract = {We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by o\th{}ering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments.},
address = {Evanston},
author = {Eddie Dekel and Matthew O. Jackson and Asher Wolinsky},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {P16; C72; 330; vote buying; lobbying; legislatures; political economy; \"{O}konomische Theorie der Demokratie; Politische Partei; Spieltheorie; Wahl; Wahlverhalten; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1433},
publisher = {Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
title = {Vote buying II: legislatures and lobbying},
type = {Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31252},
year = {2006}
}
