@techreport{Shneyerov2008rate,
abstract = {We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. We first consider generalized random-proposer take-it-or-leave-it offer games (GRP TIOLI games). This class of games includes a simple random-proposer TIOLI game, but also many other interesting bargaining games. A friction parameter is t , the length of the time period until the next meeting. We find that as t - O, all market equilibria converge to the Walrasian limit, at the fastest possible rate O(t) among all bargaining mechanisms. Some important bargaining games not in this class may have non-convergent market equilibria. This is the case for the k-double auction: we find that there are equilibria that converge at a linear rate, those that converge  at a slower rate or even not converge at all.},
address = {Evanston},
author = {Artyom Shneyerov and Adam Chi Leung Wong},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C73; C78; D83; 330; Matching and bargaining; search; double auctions; foundations for perfect competition; rate of convergence},
language = {eng},
number = {1467},
publisher = {Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
title = {The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms},
type = {Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31237},
year = {2008}
}
