@techreport{Pai2008Optimal,
abstract = {We consider an environment where potential buyers of an indivisible good have liquidity constraints, in that they cannot pay more than their `budget' regardless of their valuation. A buyer's valuation for the good as well as her budget are her private information. We derive constrained-e±cient and revenue maximizing auctions for this setting. In general, the optimal auction requires `pooling' both at the top and in the middle despite the maintained assumption of a monotone hazard rate. Further, the auctioneer will never \textasciimacron{}nd it desirable to subsidize bidders with low budgets.},
address = {Evanston},
author = {Mallesh Pai and Rakesh V. Vohra},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D44; 330; optimal auction; budget constraints; Auktionstheorie; Budgetrestriktion; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1471},
publisher = {Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
title = {Optimal auctions with financially constrained bidders},
type = {Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31205},
year = {2008}
}
