@techreport{Horner2006Private,
abstract = {We study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private signals about the objects. value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this information is eventually revealed and the seller extracts es-sentially the entire rent (for large discount factors). Both players.payo\th{}s tend to zero as the discount factor tends to one. However, the uninformed bidder does relatively better than the informed bidder. We discuss the case of two-sided incomplete information, and argue that, under a Markovian re.nement, the outcome is pooling: information is revealed only insofar as it does not a\th{}ect prices. Bidders submit a common, low bid in the tradition of .collusion without conspiracy.},
address = {Evanston},
author = {Johannes H\"{o}rner and Julian Jamison},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; D44; 330; repeated game with incomplete information; private information; ratchet effect; first-price auction; dynamic auctions; Auktionstheorie; Asymmetrische Information; Wiederholte Spiele; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1422},
publisher = {Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
title = {Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions},
type = {Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31198},
year = {2006}
}
