@techreport{Calzolari2006Monopoly,
abstract = {This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and inter-bidder resale, where the winner resells to the losers. To influence the resale outcome, the monopolist must design an allocation rule and a disclosure policy that optimally fashion the beliefs of the participants in the secondary market. Our results show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism may require a stochastic selling procedure and a disclosure policy richer than the simple announcement of the decision to trade.},
address = {Evanston},
author = {Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D44; D82; 330; information linkage between primary and secondary markets; optimal disclosure policy; stochastic allocations; mechanism design.; Monopol; Auktionstheorie; Dynamisches Spiel; Unvollkommene Information; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1405},
publisher = {Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
title = {Monopoly with resale},
type = {Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31176},
year = {2006}
}
