@techreport{Gersbach2010Democratic,
abstract = {In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal taxation, exemption of the agenda setter from taxation, and a ban on subsidies. In the presence of aggregate shocks to benefits or to costs of public-good provision, tax-sensitive majority rules, where the size of the required majority depends on the aggregate tax revenues, yield first-best allocations if a monotonicity condition is met. Finally, we explore the potential of first-best constitutions to induce voluntary participation by compensating agents belonging to the minority.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Hans Gersbach},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D62; D72; H40; 330; democratic constitutions; tax-sensitive majority rules; constitutional rules; provision of public goods; \"{O}ffentliches Gut; Versorgung; Demokratie; Abstimmungsregel; Steuerpolitik; Verfassungs\"{o}konomik; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2939},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {Democratic provision of divisible public goods},
type = {CESifo working paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30740},
year = {2010}
}
