@techreport{Strausz2010political,
abstract = {This paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk. It shows that political parties have incentives to reduce regulatory risk actively: Mutually beneficial pre-electoral agreements that reduce regulatory risk always exist. Agreements that fully eliminate it exist when political divergence is small or electoral uncertainty is appropriately skewed. These results follow from a fluctuation effect of regulatory risk that hurts parties and an output-expansion effect that benefits at most one party. Due to commitment problems, regulatory agencies with some degree of political independence are needed to implement pre-electoral agreements.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Roland Strausz},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; 330; regulation; regulatory risk; political economy; electoral uncertainty; independent regulatory agency; Regulierung; Politische Entscheidung; Risiko; Aufsichtsbeh\"{o}rde; Selbstverwaltung; Public Choice; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2953},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {The political economy of regulatory risk},
type = {CESifo working paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30724},
year = {2010}
}
