@techreport{Gersbach2009Campaigns,
abstract = {We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two equilibria, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Hans Gersbach},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; D72; 330; elections; campaign contributions; interest groups; Wahlkampf; Wahlkampffinanzierung; Interessenpolitik; Gleichgewicht; Spieltheorie; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2834},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {Campaigns, political mobility, and communication},
type = {CESifo working paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30577},
year = {2009}
}
