@techreport{Dragu2009Terrorism,
abstract = {How does electoral accountability affect the effectiveness of terrorism prevention in a democ- racy? We analyze the connection between electoral accountability and policy effectiveness in the context of terrorism prevention. We develop a formal model of an interaction between a government, a minority community, and a representative voter. All actors share the objective of terrorism prevention and have symmetric information. We show that electoral pressures to be successful in terrorism prevention create a commitment problem for the government and this can lead to less security. If the representative voter cares more about terrorism prevention, the government intensifies anti-terrorism activities that are under its direct control, but cooperation by the minority community weakens, and, as a result, security may decrease. We also show that commitment to ex-post suboptimal anti-terrorism activity is desirable for the government, but such commitment is difficult to achieve without explicit institutional constraints such as an effective judicial review on government's antiterrorism actions.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Tiberiu Dragu and Mattias Polborn},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D70; 330; terrorism; elections; accountability},
language = {eng},
number = {2864},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {Terrorism prevention and electoral accountability},
type = {CESifo working paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30493},
year = {2009}
}
