@article{Clark2010Endogenous,
abstract = {This paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred outcome of a welfare maximising authority if ex ante marginal cost is sufficiently high, and the threefirm coalition is preferred otherwise. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcomes result in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. Aircraft engine manufacturing provides a case study, and indicates the importance of antitrust issues as an addition to the theory.},
address = {Kiel},
author = {Derek J. Clark and Jan Yngve Sand},
copyright = {http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en},
doi = {10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-1},
journal = {Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal},
keywords = {L11; L13; 330; R&D; endogenous coalitions; asymmetric firms; Industrielle Forschung; Forschungskooperation; Koalition; Verhandlungstheorie; Forschungskosten; Wohlfahrtseffekt; Konzentrationspolitik; Flugzeugantrieb; Theorie; Welt},
language = {eng},
number = {2010-1},
pages = {1-48},
publisher = {Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)},
title = {Endogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industries},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29632},
volume = {4},
year = {2010}
}
