@techreport{Osterloh2008Political,
abstract = {Setting minimum tax rates is a well discussed way of mitigating pressure from tax competition. This paper investigates which motives shape the support for a minimum corporate tax among politicians. We make use of a unique data base: a survey among members of the European parliament. Our results confirm that the politicians' ideology as well as individual characteristics such as educational background exert a major in uence. Moreover, several predictions regarding national interests are derived from various standard tax competition models. These hypotheses are partly supported by the data; in particular, different national preferences for social equality shape the support. A comparison with survey results from the German Bundestag reveals that German politicians on the national level do not show different preferences towards tax rate harmonization.},
address = {Mannheim},
author = {Steffen Osterloh and Friedrich Heinemann},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H25; H87; D78; 330; company taxation; tax harmonization; political economy; European Parliament; K\"{o}rperschaftsteuer; Unternehmensbesteuerung; EU-Steuerrecht; Steuerharmonisierung; Public Choice; EU-Staaten; Deutschland},
language = {eng},
number = {08-108},
publisher = {Zentrum f\"{u}r Europ\"{a}ische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)},
title = {The Political Economy of Corporate Tax Harmonization: Why Do European Politicians (Dis)like Minimum Tax Rates?},
type = {ZEW Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27591},
year = {2008}
}
