@techreport{Beschorner2008Shorter,
abstract = {The traditional argument that shorter product cycles favor trade secret over patenting is reviewed. A game theoretic model provides an argument that shorter product cycles can induce firms to file more patent applications. The firms may be trapped in a prisoners' dilemma where all firms would jointly prefer to patent less and to not have a patent thicket. If firms start applying for patents on technologies which are not yet mature in order to cover ideas that may eventually turn successful, this may create a patent thicket. The transition into a situation where firms start patenting many ideas instead of single mature technologies is initiated and accelerated when network effects are present or patents exhibit a blocking property.},
address = {Mannheim},
author = {Patrick Frank Ernst Beschorner},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L1; L2; O31; K2; 330; patent thicket; product cycles; licensing; network effects; Patent; Innovationswettbewerb; Gefangenendilemma; Network Externalities; Lizenzvergabe; Theorie; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {08-098},
publisher = {Zentrum f\"{u}r Europ\"{a}ische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)},
title = {Do Shorter Product Cycles Induce Patent Thickets?},
type = {ZEW Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27580},
year = {2008}
}
