@techreport{Dubey2008Perfect,
abstract = {We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Pradeep Dubey and Dieter Sondermann},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; D41; D44; D61; 330; Limit orders; double auction; Nash equilibria; Walras equilibria; mechanism design; Auktionstheorie; Nash-Gleichgewicht; Allgemeines Gleichgewicht; Mechanism  Design; Oligopol; Bilaterales Monopol; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2008,9},
publisher = {Graduate School of Economics},
title = {Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)},
type = {Bonn econ discussion papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27170},
year = {2008}
}
