@techreport{Budde2008Limited,
abstract = {Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle ont hepositive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained. Increasing risk leads to a less informative performance signal. Under limited liability, the principal may optimally react by increasing the weight on the signal and, hence, choosing higher-powered incentives.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {J\"{o}rg Budde and Matthias Kr\"{a}kel},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; D86; 330; moral hazard; limited liability; risk-incentive relationship; Moral Hazard; Beschr\"{a}nkte Haftung; Leistungsanreiz; Risikoaversion; Agency Theory; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2008,6},
publisher = {Graduate School of Economics},
title = {Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship},
type = {Bonn econ discussion papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27167},
year = {2008}
}
