@techreport{Bond2005Coordinating,
abstract = {Individuals' inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development. In this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income-based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high investment outcome. A general property of this game is the presence of a crossover investment point at which an individual's incomes from investment and non-investment are equal. We show that arbitrarily small errors in the government&rsquo;s knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high investment outcome. We conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a government's ability to use income-based incentive schemes as a coordination device.},
address = {New Haven, Conn.},
author = {Philip Bond and Rohini Pande},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {O21; H23; 330; Coordination; public policy; income taxation; implementation},
language = {eng},
number = {924},
publisher = {Yale Univ., Economic Growth Center},
title = {Coordinating development: can income-based incentive schemes eliminate pareto inferior equilibria?},
type = {Center discussion paper // Economic Growth Center},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26967},
year = {2005}
}
