@techreport{Long2008Yardstick,
abstract = {This paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and corruption. We assume that voters use a yardstick criterion. The incumbent provides a public good and extracts rent, which are financed by imposing a distortionary tax. We demonstrate the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent seeking. We complement the static setting with a dynamic scenario where each incumbent politician faces an election after a finite, fixed term. Under relative performance evaluation, dynamic incentives impose more restriction on rent appropriation in comparison to the static case.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Ngo Van Long and Bodhisattva Sengupta},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H11; H73; H77; 330; Yardstick competition; rent-seeking; public good; electoral incentives; Yardstick Competition; Public Choice; Rent Seeking; Wahl; \"{O}konomischer Anreiz; \"{O}ffentliches Gut; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2345},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {Yardstick competition, corruption, and electoral incentives},
type = {CESifo working paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26390},
year = {2008}
}
