@techreport{DalleNogare2008Term,
abstract = {According to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results based on U.S. states and international data.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Chiara Dalle Nogare and Roberto Ricciuti},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {E62; H11; 330; term limits; comparative politics; fiscal policy; Finanzpolitik; Regelgebundene Politik; \"{O}ffentliche Schulden; Systemvergleich; Sch\"{a}tzung; USA; Welt},
language = {eng},
number = {2199},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {Term limits: do they really affect fiscal policy choices?},
type = {CESifo working paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26244},
year = {2008}
}
