@techreport{Gersbach2008Minority,
abstract = {In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects where the first-period project may have a long-lasting impact. In the first period a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting only voting losers keep the voting right in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Hans Gersbach and Theresa Fahrenberger},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D7; 330; voting; minority; durable decision; risk aversion; tyranny of majority rules; Abstimmungsregel; Minderheit; Wahlsystem; Zeitkonsistenz; Risikoaversion; Public Choice},
language = {eng},
number = {2198},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {Minority voting and long-term decisions},
type = {CESifo working paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26243},
year = {2008}
}
