@techreport{Bouckaert2008Price,
abstract = {Competition authorities and regulatory agencies sometimes impose pricing restrictions on firms with substantial market power  the dominant firms. We analyze the welfare effects of a ban on behaviour-based price discrimination in a two-period setting where the market displays a competitive and a sheltered segment. A ban on higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers decreases prices in the sheltered segment, relaxes competition in the competitive segment, increases the rivals profits, and may harm the dominant firms profits. We show that a ban on higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers increases the dominant firms share of the first-period market. A ban on lower-prices-to-rivals-customers decreases prices in the competitive segment, lowers the rivals profits, and augments the consumer surplus. In particular, while second-period competition is relaxed by a ban on lower-prices-to-rivals-customers, first-period competition is intensified substantially, which leads to lower prices on-average over the two periods. Our findings indicate that a dynamic two-period analysis may lead to conclusions opposite to those drawn from a static one-period analysis.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Jan Bouckaert and Hans Degryse and Theon van Dijk},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D11; 330; dominant firms; price discrimination; competition policy; regulation; Preisdifferenzierung; Marktmacht; Preisaufsicht; Wohlfahrtseffekt; Wettbewerbstheorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2192},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {Price discrimination bans on dominant firms},
type = {CESifo working paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26237},
year = {2008}
}
