@techreport{Konstantinidis2007Gradualism,
abstract = {This paper introduces a new theoretical framework of international unions qua coalitions of countries adopting a common policy and common supranational institutions. We introduce a general class of non-cooperative spatial bargaining games of coalition formation among three countries in order to examine the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and enlargement of international unions. Why would we observe a gradualist approach in the formation of the grand coalition even if the latter is assumed to be weakly efficient? We propose uncertainty about the benefits of integration as a mechanism that can generate gradual union formation in equilibrium. As it turns out, it may well be in the core countries interest to delay the accession of a third, peripheral country in order to i) stack the institutional make-up of the initial union in their favor and ii) signal their high resolve to wait out the expansion of their bilateral subunion. A related case from the European Union provides an interesting illustration.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Nikitas Konstantinidis},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {F53; C72; D82; 330; Wirtschaftsunion; Politische Integration; Koalition; Verhandlungstheorie; Mehr-L\"{a}nder-Modell; Europ\"{a}ische Integration; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2076},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {Gradualism and uncertainty in international union formation},
type = {CESifo working paper},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26121},
year = {2007}
}
