@techreport{Fehn2001positive,
abstract = {This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a sustantial protection of insiders on both markets. The more important money is in political decision-making, the more devided the workface is, and the more globalized capital markets are, the more likely is a capitalist politicoeconomic equilibrium with little employment and substantial investor protection. Our prediction of a negative cross-country relationship between labor market rigidities and of competition on capital markets receives considerable empicical support.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Rainer Fehn and Carsten-Patrick Meier},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {G34; K22; K42; 330; labor markets; employment protection; corporatism; corporate governance; shareholder protection; political economy; Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung; Korporatismus; Public Choice; Arbeitsrecht; Aktienrecht; Corporate Governance; Insider-Outsider-Modell; Sch\"{a}tzung; Theorie; Welt},
language = {eng},
number = {456},
publisher = {CESifo GmbH},
title = {The positive economics of labor market rigidities and investor protection},
type = {CESifo working paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2596},
year = {2001}
}
